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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper provides an analysis of some existing as well as new evidence of the 
relation between market prices and fundamentals in the internet sector over the period 
January 1998 to February 2000. Appealing to results across a broad class of outcomes, 
we demonstrate a strong, circumstantial case against market rationality In particular, we 
investigate (i) the level of internet stock prices given their underlying fundamentals, (ii) 
responses of stock prices to information-based events, and (iii) the volatility of internet 
prices. We review several potential explanations of these phenomena, including one 
based on heterogenous beliefs across investors who are subject to short sales constraints. 
We provide a discussion of the empirical evidence supporting this latter explanation. 
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I.  Introduction 
 
By February 2000, the internet-related sector equaled 6% of the market capitalization 
of all U.S. public companies. This was a sector, however, which in aggregate had 
negative earnings. To many practitioners and academics alike, this represented 
“irrational”  valuation levels most commonly seen in virgin markets, or in extreme cases 
like the South Sea bubble of 1720 or Tulipmania in 1637 Holland,1  not in the most well 
developed capital market in the world. 
Market rationality is of paramount importance to financial economists for a number 
of reasons and, therefore, not surprisingly, one of the most studied topics (e.g., see Fama 
(1970, 1998) and Shleifer (2000)). From an investor’s point of view, participation in 
financial markets and allocation of assets across one’s portfolio depends crucially on 
one’s belief about the efficiency of markets. Alternatively, from a corporate finance 
perspective, the allocation of capital and investment (or lack thereof) in positive net 
present value projects is fundamentally determined by one’s view of the market’s 
rationality.  
This paper provides a comprehensive look at the rationality of one particular sector of 
the economy, notably that of internet-related businesses. We focus our analysis in three 
particular areas which demonstrate quite extraordinary behavior of the internet sector. 
The first area involves traditional valuation metrics for firms and what they imply for 
internet firms during this period. Integrated into this analysis is the growing literature in 
accounting on how internet-based metrics fit into a firm’s valuation. The second area 
takes specific corporate finance events, such as spinoffs, etc..., and illustrates well-
documented cases of the breakdown of the law of one price, rational response to 
information, and the like. The third area focuses on a topic which has received somewhat 
less attention, namely the volatility patterns of internet stocks versus “old economy” 
                                                 
1 Of course, not all economists even agree that  these episodes represent irrational bubbles, e.g., Garber 
(1989). 
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firms. We find it is difficult to reconcile the “excessive” volatility of the internet sector 
given the usual measures of private information within a microstructure setting. 
When asset prices exhibit anomalous behavior, financial economists often point to 
illiquidity as the root cause. That is, the financial anomaly does not have great importance 
as few transactions can take place at the prevailing price. However, this was not the case 
for internet stocks. Individuals could, and did, trade large amounts at the prevailing 
measured prices. For example, consistently through the 1998-2000 period, pure-play 
internet firms represented as much as 20% of the dollar volume in the public equity 
market even though their market capitalization never exceeded 6%. That these prices are 
real is bad news for financial economists, like ourselves, who believe in the rational 
formation of asset prices. 
The fact that we are able to document bizarre behavior of internet prices will not 
come as a surprise to academics or practitioners alike. Nevertheless, we feel it is a useful 
exercise to report both the characteristics and magnitude of the so-called internet bubble, 
thus, not relying on anecdotal evidence alone. Arguably, the most interesting question is 
not whether there was a bubble, but how did it come about, why did it persist, and what 
caused it to burst? These questions pose quite a challenge to financial economists. Given 
our view that well developed capital markets are primarily driven by rational investors, 
why didn’t these investors come into the market and drive prices back down to 
fundamental levels? 
There is a growing literature that addresses this question, and our paper summarizes 
this view (see Ofek and Richardson (2001) for a detailed analysis as it applies to the 
internet sector). Shleifer (2000) provides us with a reasonable way to look at the issue of 
how human behavior can impact financial asset prices. He argues that there are two 
necessary conditions: (i) irrationality on the part of some investors, and (ii) limits to 
arbitrage such that this irrationality cannot get drowned out.  There is substantive 
evidence that the internet sector  satisfies these two conditions. 
With respect to the first condition, few economists will argue with the supposition 
that there exists irrational investors, just with whether they matter or not. In fact, a 
number of studies show that individual investors (i.e., retail) make irrational trading 
decisions (e.g., Barber and Odean (1999, 2002)). Furthermore, there is a large literature 
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in behavioral finance describing the various idiosyncracies of investors (e.g., see 
Hirshleifer (2001) for a survey of these findings). While some of these findings can be 
taken with a gain of salt, there are several supportive facts: (i) the internet sector had 
many more retail investors than institutional ones compared to other stocks (Hand (2000), 
Ofek and Richardson (2001)), (ii) these investors were inexperienced to the extent this 
was their first foray into investing (Barber and Odean (2001)), and (iii) the internet sector 
itself was new and faced considerable uncertainty about its valuation prospects. This 
latter fact is an important part of the story as presumably even irrational investors cannot 
ignore certain, or indisputable, facts. 
With respect to the second condition, even though there might have been plenty of 
capital available for “rational” trading, we argue that the market had limited ability to 
short internet stocks either because they were unwilling or found it too difficult to do so.  
We discuss the existing evidence which is based on several characteristics of the data: (i) 
the downside risk of shorting internet stocks, (ii) the amount of short interest in internet 
versus non-internet stocks, (iii) the rebate rate on short interest for internet versus non-
internet stocks, and  (iv) put-call parity violations in the options market for internet 
versus non-internet stocks. 
In a world with limited arbitrage and significant numbers of irrational investors, there 
is considerable support in the finance literature for prices deviating from fundamental 
value. The basic idea roots back to the original CAPM theories, in particular, Lintner’s 
(1969) model of asset prices with investors having heterogenous beliefs. In his 
framework, asset prices are a weighted average of beliefs about asset payoffs with the 
weights being determined by the investor’s risk aversion and beliefs about asset price 
covariances. While the asset prices are equilibrium-determined to the extent that they 
reflect the underlying beliefs about payoffs, one could argue that for the internet  the 
beliefs of enough of these agents were overly optimistic, or, perhaps more harshly, crazy. 
As Lintner (1969), and many others after him, show that in this world short sales 
restrictions can lead to widely inflated prices. (See, for example, Miller (1977), Jarrow 
(1980), Chen, Hong and Stein (2000),  and Duffie, Garleanu and Pedersen (2002)). 
However, when short sales restrictions no longer bind investors, then prices fall back 
down. We argue that the unlocking of literally hundreds of billions of dollars of shares in 
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the internet sector in Spring 2000 had the equivalent effect of removing short sales 
restrictions. This in turn led to internet prices reflecting the aggregate view across 
investors, not just the optimistic ones – leading to the so-called internet bubble burst. 
 
II. Internet Prices: A Snapshot 
 
This paper studies various characteristics of internet-related companies over the 
period January, 1998 to February, 2000. We use the sample of firms constructed by Ofek 
and Richardson (2001) which uses Morgan Stanley’s breakdown of various internet 
sectors – (i) portals, (ii) infrastructure companies, (iii) infrastructure services, (iv) 
software, (v) commerce, (vi) consulting and applications, (vii) financial services, (viii) 
multi-sector, (ix) vertical portals, (x) marketing and advertising services, and (xi) B2B 
commerce. Essentially, the sample restricts itself to pure internet firms which yields a 
total of 400 companies in the above internet-related sectors. Table 1 gives a further 
breakdown of these 400 companies by internet sector and “old economy” counterpart 
industry. 
Figure 1 graphs an equally-weighted portfolio of our internet sample, the Nasdaq and 
the S&P 500. The incredible rise in internet values from 1998 to 2000 has to be 
considered one of the most amazing asset pricing phenomenons of our time. These 
numbers are part of the cornerstone of our analyzing the excessive price levels and 
volatility of internet-related stocks. 
Figure 2 reports both the aggregate daily volume and market capitalization of the 
internet sector throughout the 1998 to 2000 time period. The figure suggests an active, 
liquid market for the internet stocks during the sample. In fact, relative to the universe of 
firms, the average volume per stock is three times higher for internet firms. That is, while 
internet firms represent 6% of the public equity market during February 2000, the pure 
internet sector represents 19% of the daily volume. This stylized fact about volume 
suggests that the internet was not just a few investors trading small amounts of stock with 
each other, but a wide scale market in which large amounts of stock exchanged hands at 
these prices. 
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The next three sections of the paper evaluate the rationality of internet price levels in 
three different ways. First, we explore the level of internet stock prices relative to their 
fundamentals using standard valuation metrics. Second, we investigate some examples of 
extreme events and look at the response of internet stock prices to information (or lack 
thereof). Third,  using various measures, we document the volatility of internet stocks. 
We show that their volatilities are large relative to non-internet stocks, yet not consistent 
with commonly used measures of private information being the root cause. 
 
 
III. Were Internet-Related Stock Prices Too High? 
 
The extraordinary rise in internet values as shown in Figure 1 has generally been 
called the “internet bubble”. The fact that prices fell in March of that year, and continued 
to fall throughout 2000, gave some credibility to this designation. However, one cannot 
infer necessarily from this ex post realization that market values did not in fact reflect 
fundamental values about cash flows. Tautologically, changing expectations about cash 
flows or discount rates, coupled with realization of various internet fundamentals, could 
also explain the rise and drop in prices. We, as well as anyone else, will not be able to 
definitively answer this question here. Instead, we follow a long line of previous 
academic research (e.g., French and Poterba (1991) and Shiller (2000), among others) to 
provide the reader with an understanding of what the market had to expect to justify such 
high valuations. 
French and Poterba (1991) use Miller and Modigliani’s (1961) model for stock 
valuation to investigate the level of Japanese equity prices in the 1980s. The model is a 
convenient way to look at equity prices because it provides the reader with a way to 
gauge the growth rate required to justify the level and movement in P/E ratios over time. 
In particular, Miller and Modigliani show, that for a firm with supernormal return 
opportunities r* over T periods, 
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where k is the fraction of earnings invested in the supernormal projects and r is the 
discount rate. Now consider the internet sector and further assume that for the first T 
periods these firms earn supernormal return r* with a fraction k=1 invested; after this 
initial period, these firms act like their “old economy” counterparts and achieve similar 
P/E ratios.  In this case, it is possible to show that equation (1) can be rewritten as 
(2)                                       
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A nice property of equation (2) is that, as long as we are willing to make an assumption 
about these firm’s long-run P/E ratios, we can estimate how large the supernormal returns 
have to be on current investments relative to required returns in order to justify current 
P/E levels. In other words, we do not need to know the magnitude of discount rates. 
Equation (2) will form the basis for our analysis to follow. 
We calculate the aggregate earnings of each of the internet sectors using Compustat. 
Even though these companies are public, many of them are startups and have negative 
earnings, so that even the aggregate earnings number is negative. This is due to 
significant costs in building the business, both from a technological point of view and 
from extensive marketing and sales costs. As a result, we consider a different measure of 
earnings potential by backing out the implicit earnings of the sector assuming that the 
companies in the sector have already achieved income margins of their industry 
counterparts.2 For example, in the ecommerce sector, we ignore the fact that the 
companies are unprofitable. Instead, given their revenue and the income margins seen in 
the retailing sector, we assume that the ecommerce sector has already reached the same 
level of profitability. 
Several observations are in order. First, the above assumption about profitability is 
clearly a “best-case” scenario for the internet sectors. In fact, many of their business 
models assume that, after some period of time, the scale of their operations will be so 
large that the added marketing and technological costs of being an internet company are 
                                                 
2 One could take the view that this is equivalent to not treating some of the business costs as expenses, but 
instead capitalizing them. We thank Stew Myers for this obervation.  
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swamped and “old economy” margins will be realized.3 Second, by accelerating the 
profitability of the sectors, and essentially assuming that they have reached this stage 
with probability one, the P/Es will be understated, resulting in a corresponding 
underestimate of what the necessary supernormal returns must be.  Third, we estimate the 
P/E ratio by taking the particular internet sector’s aggregate market value of equity 
divided by its implicit earnings.4 These earnings are calculated by multiplying its 
aggregate revenues by the assumed income margin. The assumed income margin is the 
weighted average margin of its closest “old economy”  counterpart. 
 Table 2 reports this information for the eleven sectors described in Table 1. For 
example, industry code 5, the ecommerce sector, includes 50 companies with an 
aggregate market capitalization as of February 2000 of 72.675 billion dollars and with 
aggregate revenues of 4.459 billion and net income of minus 3.565 billion. Using the 
industry margins of 1.9%, we can back out implied earnings of 85 million, which gives 
the industry an implied, new economy P/E ratio of 856. Given an assumption about the 
old economy P/E ratio and the number of years excess returns can be achieved, Equation 
5 can then be used to generate how large these returns must be to justify the 856 level.  
The results in Table 2 correspond to the eleven internet sectors in aggregate; it is also 
of interest to document the implied P/Es firm by firm. Figure 3 graphs the distribution of 
these P/Es across the entire sample of internet-related firms. As seen from the figure, the 
vast majority of the P/Es seem high relative to the types of P/Es usually represented by 
firms (e.g., Shiller (2000)). For example, almost 20% of the firms have P/E ratios in 
excess of 1500, while over 50% exceed 500. This seems especially large given that the 
implied P/Es are derived from the revenue streams of these firms rather than their 
earnings.  
In order to better understand the implications of these P/E numbers, Table 3A 
documents the relative size of supernormal returns, (1+ r*)/(1+r)-1, needed to justify the 
aggregate P/E ratio of the entire internet sector under various assumptions about long-run 
                                                 
3 There are clearly some types of internet business models in which the goal is to surpass their old economy 
counterpart’s margins. We ignore these except to point out that earnings move one-to-one with margin 
increases. The interested reader can, therefore, adjust the P/E ratios according to his/her beliefs. 
4 The market value of equity here most likely underestimates the value of the firm. This is due to the fact 
that internet companies have considerable amounts of stock options which do not get capitalized until the 
options are exercised. 
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P/E ratios and the time period over which firms can achieve supernormal returns. For an 
historically high P/E ratio of 20, the internet sector would need to generate 40.6% excess 
returns for a 10-year period to justify its current implied P/E ratio of 605. Under the 
strong assumption that all earnings get reinvested, and even if these opportunities lasted 
30 years, excess returns for the entire internet sector still need to be 12.0%. Given Figure 
3, and using the fact that 25% of the firms have P/Es of 1000, this implies that 25% of the 
firms need 47.9% excess returns on capital over a 10-year period. 
An alternative way of writing equation (2), and in the more familiar framework of 
earnings growth rates, it naturally follows that: 
                                    (3)                            
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where g is the growth rate in earnings (assuming all earnings get reinvested). The 
intuition of equation (3) is that the drop in P/Es from today to the target P/E must reflect 
the fact that earnings grow at a much higher rate than expected returns (i.e., the cost of 
capital).  
Assuming a cost of capital of 0%, i.e., zero expected returns over the next few 
decades, the results previously described in Table 3A correspond to the required growth 
in earnings. Thus, even if investors required no return on the internet sector, earnings 
growth would have to range between 12.0% (for 30 years) to 40.6% (for 10 years) at a 
target P/E of 20. How large is 40.6% for 10 years? Chan, Karceski and Lakonishok 
(2001) report the distribution of earnings growth over a 10-year period from 1951-1998 
for both all firms and the two largest deciles.5 At the most extreme distribution tail they 
report (i.e., at 98%), the growth rates are 31.3% and 22.6%, respectively.  Thus, our 
results are extraordinary for several reasons: (i) the required growth rates are between 50-
100% higher than the highest 2% of existing firms, (ii) the growth rates reflect an entire 
sector, not just the ex post performance of the very best firms, and (iii) these growth rates 
imply a cost of capital of 0%. 
At a more reasonable cost of capital, Table 3B provides the various growth rates in 
equation (3) needed to justify P/Es between 10 and 30 over different time periods. For 
                                                 
5 As Chan, Karceski and Lakonishok (2001) point out, their sample is subject to survivorship bias. In 
particular, their numbers are biased upwards as their sample reflects the more successful firms. 
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example, at a  weighted average cost of capital of 16%, these excess returns translate to 
63.1% growth rate in their implied earnings. This is as much as three times higher than 
the top 2% earnings performers from the Chan, Karceski and Lakonsihok sample. Even 
with a long-run P/E ratio of 30, and thirty years of supernormal returns, the growth rate 
required is still as high as 28.2%.  
This analysis  is not the first to point out the excessive P/E ratios in the stock market 
during this period (e.g., Demers and Lev (2000) and Shiller (2000)). Beyond the financial 
press at large, Shiller (2000), for example, shows that the P/E ratios for the aggregate 
market were at their highest value of any period in the 20th century, including the 
infamous market crash of 1929 and the “nifty-fifty” of the late 60’s. Moreover, we have 
focused on the internet sector and shown that these P/E ratios were much higher than the 
aggregate markets’.  In fact, putting the “best-case” scenario assumptions aside, the 
results of Table 3 imply that, for a significant period of time, the market would have to 
expect excess returns on their investments of 30-40% above their cost of capital. That is, 
in a competitive product market with few barriers to entry, and across over 400 public 
firms representing 6% of the public market capitalization, expected continual, aggregate 
profits of this magnitude would appear extraordinary. At the minimum, this represents 
strong circumstantial evidence of investors being optimistic about the future growth 
opportunities of this sector. 
Aside from optimism, what else can explain these excess returns on capital? 
One unique characteristic about internet-related firms during this period is that they 
tended to go public relatively soon after incorporation. One possibility is that the large 
implied excess returns on capital for internet firms reflects the firm’s age rather than an 
overvaluation argument. That is, if “old economy” firms had gone public prematurely, 
and we had gathered data on these companies, we would find similar P/Es. This 
explanation requires the condition that P/E ratios should decline very rapidly as a firm 
develops. Since most economist’s intuition on what is a reasonable excess return on 
capital derives from experience with old economy companies, it seems worthwhile 
exploring the possibility that firm age plays an important role. We estimated the cross-
sectional correlations of various measures of the sample of internet firms, including the 
implied P/E of each firm and its age. Though the relation is negative, i.e., younger firms 
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have higher P/Es, it is barely so, yielding a correlation of 0.09. Thus, less than 1% of the 
cross-sectional variation in P/Es can be explained by the firm’s age. Moreover, this 
correlation estimate is also not significant from a statistical point of view. 
The other related possibility is that today’s revenues (and implied earnings measures) 
are not representative of the future potential of these firms. That is, the valuation relation 
in equation (2) is not a good approximation in practice. In fact, recent work by Schwartz 
and Moon (2000) argues that internet companies have so many strategic/real options 
available to them that standard discounted cash flow-based models are no longer 
appropriate. However, it is important to point out that these options eventually must 
translate into revenue streams that reflect the growth rates documented above. 
 
IV.  Event Driven Irrationality 
 
There is a long history in financial economics of analyzing the effect an economic 
event has on the value of financial assets. The importance of this type of an analysis for 
studying market rationality has been well-known since Ball and Brown’s (1968) earnings 
announcement study and Fama, Fisher, Jensen, and Roll’s (1969) stock-split analysis. 
The basic idea is that in a rational market prices should immediately reflect the 
information contained in the event. Conversely, if the event contains very little 
information, then prices should not move much at all. There have been a series of papers 
written on financing events in the internet-related sector which document seemingly 
irrational price responses. These price moves do not only violate conditions like the law 
of one price, but are also so large in magnitude that explanations are difficult to come by. 
The one consistent theme, however, is an overly optimistic aggregate belief about the 
“new economy” firm’s potential in the face of other overriding information.  The fact that 
there are a significant number of events that defy rational valuations does not in itself 
prove gross market inefficiency in the internet sector. It is, however, consistent with the 
relative high level of internet prices documented in Section III being driven by irrational 
investors.  
  Below, we highlight some of our favorite examples: 
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A. What Is in a Name? 
 
When one considers corporate events that should have little effect on the financials of 
the company, a name change should be high on the list. It may seem plausible to consider 
a name change as a signal  of a firm’s intent. However, if that signal is relatively costless, 
then it probably is not that credible. A more plausible signal probably entails some costly 
action which signifies a switch in business plans, or, in our case, a transformation 
towards being an internet company. Alternatively, these firms may already be involved in 
the internet, yet this information has not gotten disseminated in the marketplace. 
Changing one’s name might represent one additional way to release this information 
though this does not really explain why rational, smart investors had not already bid the 
stock price up to reflect public information about the firm’s internet activities. In any 
event, one might expect there to be little stock price reaction, and, in fact, prior to the 
internet craze, the existing literature provided supporting evidence of this (e.g., Bosch 
and Hirschey (1989) and Karpoff and Rankine (1994)). 
      Similar to these earlier studies, Cooper, Dimitrov, and Rau (2000) investigate the 
stock price response of firms that change their name to an Internet-related name such as 
dotcom, dotnet or inclusion of the word Internet. Specifically, they look at a sample of 
147 firms over the period June 1998 to August 1999 period. These firms tend to be low 
capitalized firms (e.g., $54.4 million on average) and almost all trade on the Nasdaq 
OTC. In contrast to the existing literature,  Cooper, Dimitrov, and Rau (2000) document 
striking results for the stock price responses of these companies. Relative to an Internet-
matched portfolio, these firms earn on average 53% excess returns over the five-day 
period surrounding the name change announcement with corresponding t-statistics of 13. 
Moreover, when the sample is segmented into subsamples based on the firms’ 
involvement with the internet, the announcement day effects  still pervade across these 
subsamples. Thus, the evidence seems more to do with the actual name change than with 
the internet-related activity level of the firm.  
As an example, consider our favorite illustration, that of Zapata corporation.  
Zapata was founded in 1953 by former President George Bush as an oil and gas 
company. However, by early 1998, Zapata had transformed itself into a company, albeit 
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still “old economy”, specializing in meat-casings and fish oil. On April 27, 1998, 
Zapata’s management announced that it was going to form a new company to acquire and 
consolidate internet and ecommerce businesses. Their first foray into this sector occurred 
in May when they bid for Excite, which was the second largest internet search directory 
at the time. Their bid was rejected by Excite’s management for its “complete lack of 
synergy” as quoted in Bloomberg at the time covering Excite’s press release. In July, 
Zapata made further announcements that were starting an internet portal and were in the 
process of purchasing about 30 internet websites. As the market for internet stocks 
deteriorated through summer and fall of 1998, Zapata announced that they were 
reevaluating their internet business strategy and no longer purchasing the websites. On 
December 23, 1998 the company reversed course again, and stated that they were getting 
back into the Internet business and will be forming the subsidiary, Zap.com. On this 
news, shares rose 98% in New York stock exchange composite trading.  This type of 
example is not atypical and is representative of the Cooper, Dimitrov and Rau (2000) 
study.  
 
B. Internet Subsidiary Mispricing 
 
There is a large literature in finance that looks at the value implications of parents and 
their publicly traded subsidiaries (e.g., see Slovin, Sushka, and Ferraro (1995) and Vijh 
(1999), among others). Obviously, from the law of one price, assets with the same 
payoffs must have the same price. Therefore, the subsidiary’s public value should be 
reflected one-for-one in the parent’s holding of that subsidiary. Assuming that market 
imperfections such as taxes and liquidity are not the explanation of breakdowns in the 
law of one price, violations of this rule are clear evidence of market irrationality. Whether 
this irrationality violates the no arbitrage restriction depends on investors’ ability to 
conduct arbitrage in the presence of transactions costs, short sales and the derivatives 
market.  
Several recent papers have explored the implications for parent and subsidiary values 
using a sample of firms that have gone through an equity carve-out transaction (e.g., 
Cornell and Liu (2000), Lamont and Thaler (2000), Schill and Zhou (2000) and Mitchell, 
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Pulvino and Stafford (2001)). That is, these authors consider parent companies who have 
sold a portion of one of their subsidiaries through a public offering. While the sample of 
firms are not solely restricted to internet subsidiaries, the majority of firms are in the 
broader sector most commonly associated with the “new economy”. These papers 
document a number of cases in which the parent’s subsidiary holding marked-to-market 
value exceed the entire parent’s value!  
As pointed out by some of these authors, these results are similar in spirit to those 
associated with the closed-end funds discount (e.g., Lee, Shleifer, and Thaler (1991)). 
The notable exception here is that the parent and subsidiary firms are generally liquid 
stocks. In fact, explanations based on those from the closed-end funds literature are 
evaluated and discarded by these authors. With respect to the stronger no arbitrage 
condition, both Lamont and Thaler (2000) and Mitchell, Pulvino and Stafford (2001) 
show that, although the mispricings are large, it would be difficult to conduct arbitrage in 
practice. Though their conclusions regarding the impediments to arbitrage are different, 
neither paper can and tries to explain why rational investors would buy the subsidiary 
over the parent in the first place? 
As an example of this irrationality, we consider one example considered by both 
Cornell and Liu (2000), Lamont and Thaler (2000) and Mitchell, Pulvino and Stafford 
(2001), namely the 3Com’s equity carve-out of Palm and its subsequent spinoff.6  On 
September 13, 1999 3Com announced its intentions to take one of its subsidiaries, Palm 
Computing (a leading manufacturer of handheld devices), public the following year. In 
fact, on March 2, 2000 Palm became publicly traded on the Nasdaq National Market with 
3Com selling a 6% stake at $38 a share which was well above the initial $14 to $16 
range. At the time of the IPO, 3Com announced its intention  to divest its remaining 94% 
ownership to 3Com shareholders within six months. 
The first day of trading was fairly astonishing as Palm opened at $145, reaching  a 
high of $165 before ending the day at $95.06. This stock price translated to a $53.4 
billion value for Palm in contrast to 3Com’s $28.5 billion value. Based on 3Com’s 94% 
ownership, 3Com’s stake in Palm was worth approximately $50 billion, giving 
                                                 
6 Lamont and Thaler (2000) provide a very detailed analysis of this event, especially with respect to 
investors’ ability to conduct arbitrage. 
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substantial negative value to 3Com’s other assets, an almost perfect violation of the law 
of one price.7 Several questions immediately arise with respect to this apparent violation 
of arbitrage. First, was this violation short-lived, representing “confusion” on the day of 
the IPO? Second, was their active trading at these misaligned prices? Third, could the 
arbitrage be performed, and, if so, was it truly riskless? We address these questions 
below. 
Figure 4 graphs the value of Palm and two measures for the value of 3Com from the 
IPO date through the spinoff on July 27, 2000. The first measure takes 3Com’s stake in 
Palm and assumes zero value for its existing assets, while the second measure includes 
the Palm stake as well as existing assets.8 As can be seen from the figure, the arbitrage 
persisted for over two months assuming no value for 3Com’s existing assets, and four 
months giving some value of these assets. Moreover, the arbitrage was large in that the 
prices deviated by 30-40% for over one month. The large deviation in prices throughout 
this period are also economically significant as substantial trading took place at these 
prices. Figure 4 also graphs the cumulative dollar volume of Palm during the relevant 
period. While dollar volume reached $10 billion during the first two weeks alone, there 
was still consistent trading throughout the period, ending in approximately $25 billion 
being traded. The effect of buying Palm rather than 3Com, i.e., the arbitrage difference 
multiplied by the daily volume, is $3.4 billion or $6.1 billion depending on which value is 
placed on 3Com. That is, investors “threw away” between $3 and $6 billion dollars, 
independent of whether arbitrage was possible.  
With respect to the question of arbitrage, the ability to short Palm shares is very much 
in question. Lamont and Thaler (2000) provide a very detailed analysis of this issue and 
conclude that, while shorting was possible and in fact performed, it was only on a limited 
                                                 
7 One could argue that (i)  the management of 3Com, or its future investment projects, had an incredible 
negative NPV, and simultaneously (ii) there was a high probability that the complete spinoff was not going 
to occur. Two facts are inconsistent with these explanations. First, when Palm was spunoff 6 months later, 
3Com’s assets were valued at $13 a share, which means that its management or assets would have to have 
improved by a large amount in a shor time. Second, while clearly the probability of a divestiture was not 
100%, the probability at the time was considered to be high. Either of these facts are enough to counter the 
rational explanation.   
8 In particular, at the time, 3Com had cash and existing operations which in theory had positive value. 
Rather than valuing these assets ourselves, we take as a noisy signal the actual market value of the assets at 
the time of the spinoff, i.e., using the August value of 3Com. Of course, this includes the market 
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basis. Using evidence on short interest and from the options market, they provide 
convincing evidence that pure arbitrage was difficult to implement en masse. Mitchell, 
Pulvino and Stafford (2001) provide complementary evidence and show that the rebate 
rate on shorts was as low as –30%. Moreover, under this background, even if an investor 
were able to borrow the stocks, the risk of getting squeezed was a serious concern. 
However, even with arbitrage being performed, there are several reasons why it was not 
riskless. First, the implied volatility of Palm’s stock during this period was over 100% 
(e.g., on May 9 the implied σ for June 30 put was 113 as reported by Bloomberg). Thus, 
the dynamic hedge necessary to ensure riskless arbitrage would have required frequent 
rebalancing of the stock position.9 Second, as stated in Palm’s IPO prospectus, the 
distribution of the remaining 94% of Palm shares to 3Com shareholders was contingent 
on a ruling from the IRS that the distribution would be tax-free.  Although a favorable 
ruling was likely, it is interesting to note that, from Figure 4, the arbitrage assuming no 
value for 3Com’s other assets disappears on May 9th, the day the IRS’s approval of the 
tax treatment was announced.  
 
C. Parent Firm Returns Around the Offer Date of Their Subsidiary IPO 
 
One related situation to subsection B. above is what happens to the stock price of the 
parent company on and around the offer date of the IPO of their internet subsidiary. For 
example, with respect to the case of 3Com and Palm, the behavior of 3Com’s return is 
very typical. Leading up to the IPO date, 3Com’s stock price increased dramatically as 
investors began to realize that Palm’s IPO was going to be very successful. In fact, it 
reached an all-time high just before Palm’s opening trade on its IPO day. For the rest of 
the day, however, 3Com’s stock price, fell from $112 to $81.80. There are two possible 
theories that can explain this pattern in returns.10 First, the parent’s stock price rise prior 
                                                                                                                                                 
expectation of the assets throughout the March to August period and any unexpected information that could 
not possibly be known during this period. Thus, this measure is noisy at best. 
9 Of course, to the extent investors care about their portfolio of assets, risky arbitrage can be riskless in a 
portfolio context if the Palm/3Com position is uncorrelated with the other assets. 
10 John Cochrane provides an alternative explanation which is based on liquidity. His argument is that there 
have always been different prices for similar assets – dollars and T-bills, off-the-run and on-the-run 
Treasury bonds, different classes of shares. Thus, if one takes the view that the turnover and liquidity is 
much higher for the subsidiary, then investors might be willing to pay for this, which is why 3Com drops at 
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to the offer date may just reflect positive news about the subsidiary’s value, while the 
subsequent fall on the IPO date is indicative of a disappointing final market value of the 
subsidiary. Of course, this explanation relies on the results being specific to a particular 
sample though the run-up could be viewed as sample selection of successful IPOs. An 
alternative view is that investors can only purchase the subsidiary by investing in the 
parent company. Once the subsidiary is spunoff, investors sell their stake in the parent 
and replace it with a position in the subsidiary. Though irrational, this sell-off produces 
the negative effect on the IPO day. 
 Tezel and Schnusenberg (2000) look at a sample of ten split-off IPOs which is 
similar to the spin-off case above except that the existing shareholders receive all the 
newly issued shares of the subsidiary. In anticipation of the IPO, the market price of the 
parent company rises on average 37% between the filing and offer date, which contrasts 
of a –2% return on the day of the IPO. Using these facts, Tezel and Schnusenberg (2000) 
develop an arbitrage strategy based on  offsetting positions in the parent and subsidiary 
depending on the net value of the parent (i.e., after its stake in the subsidiary has been 
removed). The average daily return across the stocks in the sample is 0.54% with all the 
stocks producing positive profitable trading opportunities. 
Our favorite example of this phenomenon is the IPO of Marketwatch.com. In 
particular, on January 15, 1999, the stock price of Data Broadcasting Corp., a 38% owner 
(along with CBS) in Marketwatch.com, fell from $31.18 to $21.75 even though the IPO 
return on that day for Marketwatch.com was over 500%, which at the time was one of the 
largest one-day returns ever. Of course, there had been  a runup in the value of Data 
Broadcasting from $17.87 to $31.18 in the prior two weeks. Other information aside, the 
drop on the IPO day means that the market must have expected a first-day rise of 888%. 
This belief would have been fairly extraordinary as it would have exceeded the largest 
one-day return ever, i.e., 697%, which would occur one year later! 
 
       V.  Excess Volatility 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
the IPO. Though we do not address this reason in the paper per se, it is important to point out that 3Com 
itself was a fairly liquid stock by all  measures.  
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        Sections III and IV provided stylized facts on two related, yet separate, points about 
internet stocks. First, the stock price levels of internet firms tended to be high relative to 
levels implied by fundamentals. Most important, this divergence was of a magnitude not 
observed in recent history. Second, the response of stock prices of internet firms to some 
high profile corporate finance events was anomalous. Again, the interesting characteristic 
of this stock price behavior is the mere magnitude of the effect. We think equally 
puzzling, and informative, about internet stock prices is their level of volatility during 
this period. Thus, in this section, we document some basic stylized facts about internet 
firms’ volatility characteristics. 
Excess volatility is generally defined as the volatility in prices that does not 
correspond to that implied by the underlying fundamentals. It is considered synonymous 
with the notion of market irrationality and has a long history in the finance literature, e.g., 
Shiller (1981) and Black (1986) being two notable papers. In Black (1986), noise trading 
and excess volatility result from the fact that investors either like to trade for no apparent 
reason or that they trade on what they believe to be “new” information when it is not. In 
fact, Black goes one step further and takes the controversial view that without noise 
traders there would be little trading at all. A substantial empirical literature emerged to 
test some of the implications of this and related work. 
      The conclusion from this empirical work is generally that volatility is primarily 
driven by trading rather than public information releases (see, for example, French and 
Roll (1986), Roll (1988), Barclay, Litzenberger and Warner (1990), and Barclay and 
Warner (1993), among others).11 However, in contrast to Black, there is a substantial 
fraction of the literature that takes the view that the volatility results more from rational 
private information traders as in Kyle (1985) than from irrational noise trading per se 
(e.g., Barclay and Warner (1993) and Ito, Lyons and Melvin (1998) compared to French 
and Roll (1986)). 
        While it is difficult to say anything definitively about whether there was excess 
volatility in the internet sector, it seems worthwhile investigating given its potential link 
to irrational noise trading. Table 4 reports various volatility measures for both the internet 
                                                 
11 There is not unanimity on this result. For example, Jones, Kaul and Lipson (1994) argue and show 
evidence in favor of public information, though this work is more the exception than the rule. 
 19
sample and the non-internet universe of stocks over the January 1998 to February 2000 
period. For example, the average daily volatility across the internet stocks is 7.4% which 
translates to an annual volatility of 117.5% (assuming 252 trading days)! Moreover, this 
volatility estimate is not driven by a few outliers as the median volatility has a 
comparable magnitude, i.e., 7.3%. This contrasts to the non-internet sample which has a 
mean and median of 3.5% and 3.0%, respectively. Thus, if one were to use the median 
estimate, internet stocks have six times the variation of other stocks. 
        In terms of gathering evidence about volatility-induced trading, it is common for the 
literature to look at the volatility during trading and nontrading hours, e.g., during the day 
versus overnight, during temporary market closures, over holidays, over weekends, 
etc…Table 4 reports the intraday volatility of the internet and non-internet sample over 
the period using the high-low volatility estimator (e.g., see Parkinson (1980), Garman and 
Klass (1980) and Beckers (1983)). This estimator uses the difference between the high 
and low value of the stock price during the day as opposed to the close to close change in 
the price. Under the assumption that stock prices follow geometric brownian motions, it 
is theoretically a much more efficient estimator as it uses information about the sample 
path.12 Moreover, it covers the period only in which trading takes place, and avoids some 
of the problems associated with choosing a set time such as the open, close or midday. 
Unfortunately, the high-low estimator can be biased downward in small samples if the 
true sample path of stock prices is not continuous.  
      The median daily high-low value for internet stocks is 9.9% versus 3.25% for the 
non-internet sample. That is, over a two-year period, stock prices ranged close to 10% per 
day over an entire sector of the economy. This result alone seems fairly remarkable and 
suggests market timing during the day could impact financing decisions! These high-low 
values translate to mean and median volatility estimators on a daily basis of 6.7% and 
6.9% versus 2.9% and 2.4% for internet versus non-internet stocks, respectively. As well 
as being economically important, these results are strongly statistically significant.   
     There are two important observations here. First, the excess volatility of the internet 
versus non-internet sample carries through to the intraday period in a similar way to the 
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24-hour period. For example, the difference between the median intraday and 24-hour 
volatilities are 40 and 61 basis points for the internet and non-internet sample, 
respectively. Thus, differences in volatility cannot be associated with volatility outside of 
either noise or rational private information trading. Second, the intraday volatility is by 
far the dominant portion of the 24-hour volatility which is consistent with previous 
studies. This is true even though trading takes place over only one-third the number of 
hours.13 Furthermore, on a percentage basis, this results is stronger for internet stocks. 
While it can be argued that more public information gets released during trading hours, it 
is also the case that important events, such as macroeconomic announcements, firm-
specific earnings announcements and conference calls, often occur after-hours.  
      Given the magnitude of the differences between the volatility of the internet and non-
internet samples, let us consider the interpretation that this evidence shows substantial 
more trading-induced volatility occurs with internet stocks. As mentioned above, 
however, there is substantive previous work that argues trading-induced volatility is 
rational due to private information. In fact, for internet firms, one might convincingly 
argue that there is more likely to be more private information because the sector is an 
emerging industry, has complex and proprietary technology, and has significant 
ownership by insiders. Alternatively, because of its notoriety and the availability of 
information, perhaps the exact opposite is true.14 
      We can look to the microstructure literature to get a guide for whether this volatility 
is being driven by private information. In particular, Glosten and Milgrom (1985) and 
Madhavan and Smidt (1991), among many others, show how volatility can be broken 
down into different components, such as public information, private information, and 
order processing (i.e., direct costs and inventory control management). Though many of 
these components are not observable, there have been a number of empirical 
                                                                                                                                                 
12 Of course, even though the geometric brownian motion model has a long history in finance, many 
researchers might consider it a poor assumption, especially in light of the heteroskedasticity and kurtosis 
that shows up in the data at short intervals. 
13 Over this period, there was a market for after-hours trading, but, on a relative basis, this market is illiquid 
as measured by the amount of volume. 
14 Schultz and Zaman (2000) and  Meulbroek (2000) investigate insider transactions at internet companies 
and find that, in contrast to usual insider selling at “old” economy firms, excess returns are not negative. 
Thus,  there is little evidence of the usual theory that they are trying to sell overpriced stock. One can view 
this evidence as generally supportive of the theory that private information, insiders being the extreme 
example, for internet firms is either not unusually large or does not get incorporated into prices. 
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investigations which develop methods to infer them (e.g., Glosten and Harris (1988), 
George, Kaul and Nimalendran (1991), Huang and Stoll (1997) and Madhavan, 
Richardson and Roomans (1997)). In particular, if one were to assume that the order 
processing component is similar across stocks (or, in this case, the internet versus non-
internet universe), then differences in the bid-ask spread will reflect differences in the 
magnitude of the private information (i.e., adverse selection) component. Essentially, the 
spread reflects the fact that dealers need to be compensated for being willing to trade with 
informed traders. A higher spread coincides with greater costs associated with informed 
trading or, in other words, a higher private information component. Of course, this higher 
component also induces higher volatility in returns. 
      Table 4 reports bid/ask spread measures in both absolute and percentage terms for the 
internet and non-internet samples as of February 2000. For both measures, the means are 
substantially lower for the internet sample, e.g., $0.35 versus $0.61 in absolute terms and 
0.7% versus 1.3% in percentage terms. That is, the internet  spreads are almost 50% of 
the non-internet firms. The results diminish somewhat if we look at the medians; 
nevertheless, they are still lower for the internet sample, e.g., $0.19 versus $0.19 and 
0.5% versus 0.8%, respectively. Within the context of the above (albeit simple) models, 
the implication of these lower spreads would be lower volatility ceteris paribus. So why 
are internet stocks so volatile? Perhaps, the sixfold variation can all be explained by 
much more fundamental, yet public, information arriving to the market. Alternatively, the 
results are consistent with irrational, noise trading along the lines of Black (1986). As an 
anecdotal comment, a February 25, 2000 SEC report on day trading cites industry 
estimates that as much as 15% of Nasdaq’s daily trading is driven by day trading even 
though the number of day traders is a small fraction of the market. While this number 
seems hard to believe, it does suggest a strong link between noise and volume, and, given 
our results, volatility.15 
 
VI.  The Internet Bubble 
 
                                                 
15 Of course, this comment is appropriate if one believes day traders are perfect examples of noise traders. 
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In this paper, we have provided a number of examples which are consistent with 
anomalous behavior of the internet sector in terms of its valuation. In particular, the 
magnitudes of some of the stylized facts are large relative to the universe of non-internet 
stocks, as well as to previously documented results. If the degree of irrationality is so 
great, and there certainly exists rational investors (with substantial amounts of capital), 
why were the severe mispricings not arbitraged away? 
Two conditions are necessary for prices to deviate from fundamental value. First, 
there must be some degree of irrationality in the market. That is, investors’ demand for 
stocks must be driven by something other than fundamentals, whether it be sentiment, 
overconfidence, or other buzzwords used be behavioral economists. Second, even if a 
market has such investors, the general argument is that rational investors will drive prices 
back to fundamental value. For this not to happen, there needs to be some limits on 
arbitrage.  
 
A. Limits to Arbitrage 
       With respect to the equity market, clearly the most important impediment to arbitrage 
are short sales restrictions. There  are essentially two reasons why investors do not short – 
either they do not want to, or it is too difficult to do so. We take both of these cases one 
by one. 
As pointed out by Chen, Hong and Stein (2000), among others, mutual funds are 
reluctant to short stocks. While this may be more a reflection of previous outdated 
legislation, such as the Investment Company Act of 1940, than anything real, it is 
relevant if mutual funds still abide by it. They cite work that shows only a small fraction 
(2%) of mutual funds short stocks, and provide evidence of greater mispricings when 
mutual funds are absent from the market. Their argument is that, due to an unwillingness 
to short,  institutions tend to avoid “overvalued” stocks. Thus, lower breadth is consistent 
with a stock being overvalued. Interestingly, as shown by Ofek and Richardson (2001), 
pension funds were very much absent from the internet sector, which is consistent with 
this explanation. 
With respect to hedge funds, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) argue that, in practice, 
arbitrage is neither capital-free nor riskless. In a model in which arbitrageurs require 
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capital from outside investors and is performance-based, they show that arbitrage may 
not be successful at forcing asset prices back to their fundamentals. They then 
hypothesize that fundamental valuation is most flawed in the presence of highly volatile 
settings. Clearly, as the volatility results in Table 4 show, the prices of internet stocks and 
their corresponding mispricing occurred in an extraordinarily volatile period. Thus, on 
some level, the internet sector satisfies the Shleifer and Vishny (1997) conditions. On the 
other hand, while this arbitrage is risky, a diversified portfolio across all assets would 
expose the trader to only the systematic risk of internet stocks. If, within a portfolio of 
assets, the risk of internet stocks represents purely idiosyncratic risk, then why would the 
capital be considered risky? 
         Hedge funds often face convex payout schemes. From the hedge fund’s point of 
view, the positive skewness of internet stock returns is a negative characteristic to have in 
one’s portfolio. The positive skewness is transparent from Table 4 which implies an 
annualized volatility  of 117% for internet-related firms. As an illustration of the 
distribution of returns facing hedge funds during this period, Figure 5 graphs the cross-
sectional distribution of the maximum return over any month (i.e., 22-day rolling period 
return) for internet and non-internet firms over the January 1999 to February 2000 time 
period. Figure 5 shows that over 90% of the internet firms had a maximum monthly 
return of 80% plus over this yearly period. Thus, even if investors thought internet stocks 
were overvalued, there was a large probability over this year that a short position would 
be down considerably at some point in time. Thus, short positions might produce on 
average excess profits but with a substantial risk of an extreme loss. These maximum 
returns did not all occur at the same time,  so diversification would somewhat reduce the 
risk over any given period. However, over this same sample period, an equally-weighted 
portfolio of the internet stocks had a maximum monthly return of 64%. Thus, even a 
well-diversified portfolio of short positions would be subject to the same problems. 
The fact that many investors are reluctant to short stocks immediately limits the 
amount of shorting that can take place. However, there are a number of other reasons 
why shorting stocks may be difficult in practice. First, in order to short a stock, the 
investor must be able to borrow it. There were only a limited number of shares available 
for trading in internet stocks, and someone (i.e., institution or individual) would have to 
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be willing to lend the shares. For whatever reason, individuals tend to lend shares less 
than institutions do. Since many of the investors in internet stocks were individuals (e.g., 
Ofek and Richardson (2001)), this reduced on the margin the supply of shares that could 
be shorted. Second, there is no guarantee that the short position would not get called 
either through the lenders demanding it back or margin calls. It is not a 100% probability  
There are a number of papers that investigate empirically the difficulty in shorting 
and how that can affect underlying equity prices (see, for example, D’Avolio (2001), 
Geczy, Musto and Reed (2001), Duffie, Garleanu and Pedersen (2002),  and Ofek, 
Richardson and Whitelaw (2002), among others). Of particular interest to this paper, 
Ofek and Richardson (2001) document several stylized facts for the internet sector: (i) 
there was substantial more shorting taking place in the internet versus non-internet sector, 
(ii) the float of shares in the internet versus non-internet sector was less, and (iii) given (i) 
and (ii), there is evidence that the short sales constraints were binding for the internet 
versus non-internet sector. This latter evidence comes in several forms. First, the rebate 
rate on shorts was significantly lower for internet versus non-internet stocks, which 
suggests more internet stocks are on special. Second, there are more put-call parity 
violations for internet stocks than non-internet stocks, which can happen only under a 
number of joint conditions, one of which is short sales restrictions. Third, the cross-
sectional correlation between the implied P/E ratios of each stock (e.g., Figure 3) and the 
rebate rate is significant at the 1% level and economically large, i.e., -0.16, which again is 
consistent with a binding short sale constraint. 
   
B.     Possible Explanations 
 
In Sections III-V, we provided evidence of anomalous behavior on the part of internet 
stock prices. Using the evidence cited above, we can posit one explanation for why this 
anomalous behavior was not drowned out by rational investors, namely short sales 
restrictions. Nevertheless, the question remains how did the internet bubble arise in the 
first place? Below, we provide three brief explanations that have been described in the 
current literature. 
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The first explanation, and one we have pushed through in our other work, is that there 
is heterogeneity of beliefs amongst investors. In particular, imagine a world with 
“optimistic” investors (dare we say, irrational ones) and “pessimistic” (rational) investors. 
Without short sales constraints, rational investors would short internet stocks, with 
“optimistic” investors simultaneously going aggressively long in these same stocks – the 
outcome would be some aggregation of these beliefs in the market. However, as the 
pessimistic investors wish to short the stock more and more, the constraint is binding and 
these investors can no longer short. Their beliefs will have less of an impact on asset 
prices, as the market clearing price no longer reflects the optimal short position, and puts 
more weight on the optimistic view of payoffs. Consider the extreme case in which the 
pessimistic investors actually leave the market and hold no stocks. In this case, asset 
prices will reflect only the beliefs of the optimistic investors and therefore prices increase 
as a result. The pessimistic investors would like to short the stocks at these inflated 
prices, thus bringing them down in value, but are prevented from doing so due to the 
short sales restrictions. This view of the world has growing support in the finance 
literature and seems particularly appropriate for the internet sector (e.g., Lintner (1969),  
Miller (1977), Jarrow (1980), Chen, Hong and Stein (2000), Jones and Lamont (2001), 
Duffie, Garleanu and Pedersen (2002) and Ofek and Richardson (2001) to name just a 
few). 
Alternatively, the behavior may not be strictly irrational since the optimism could  fit 
the theory of rational bubbles (e.g., Blanchard and Watson (1982), Froot and Obstfeld 
(1991) and Sheinkman and Xiong (2001)). Rational bubbles occur when investors satisfy 
their first order conditions from their consumption and investment decision, yet asset 
prices do not reflect their fundamental values, i.e., the discounted value of expected 
future cash flows. This is because today’s price also reflects the discounted value of the 
future price (possibly way in the distant future) which may not equal its fundamental 
value. The intuition is that, even though asset prices lie above their fundamental values, 
investors still value the asset highly because of the possibility of even higher prices in the 
future. Of course, through iteration, this implies some possibility of an infinite price in 
the future.  This and other reasons has led many researchers to question the theoretical 
viability of rational bubbles (e.g., Diba and Grossman (1988), Santos and Woodford 
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(1997) and Cochrane (2001)). Nevertheless, by making the bubbles somewhat less than 
fully rational (e.g., Brunnermeier (2001)), the high internet prices are consistent with the 
idea of high future internet stock prices not tied to fundamental values. Unfortunately, 
because this future price is by nature never observed in our sample, it is difficult to 
provide formal evidence.  
The final explanation takes the view that, as economists and practitioners, we are 
looking back at this period in hindsight. While there was considerable discussion during 
the period about the “craziness” of internet prices, and we feel much of the evidence 
speaks for itself, there is no doubt that very sophisticated investors, and highly regarded 
managers of companies, invested considerable capital in the internet sector. These 
investments alone suggest that a story based on an influx of irrational, retail investors is 
probably too simplistic. Kaplan (2002) provides a nice analysis of this alternative view of 
internet valuations. In particular, Kaplan (2002) focuses on growth expectations and 
corresponding revisions of these expectations during the 1998-2000 period. 
Any cohesive explanation of the sudden rise in internet stock prices should also be 
able to explain their rapid fall. For explanations that are based on the presence of some 
irrational investors in the market, one of two conditions must change: (i) either these 
individuals become rational all of a sudden, or (ii) the limits of arbitrage get removed. 
With respect to (i), it will be difficult to explain why a large group of investors shifted 
their beliefs, though some of the recent rational bubble theories show promise here. In 
contrast, while at first glance condition (ii) does not seem promising either (i.e., why was 
shorting all of a sudden possible?), we actually think this is the answer. During the early 
spring of 2000, i.e., just before the initial crash, an incredible amount of internet firms 
had their shares unlocked.16 In theory, the lockup expiration eventually adds four to five 
times more shares to a stock’s float, but, most important, it allows a whole new, 
presumably more rational,  group of investors sell their shares in the market. That is, it 
unbinds the short sale constraint in a major way. In fact, in the time period before the 
crash, of the $900 billion or so market value of the entire internet sector, $250 billion 
worth of shares were being unlocked. This event essentially removed the short sales 
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constraint on the internet sector by allowing for 25%-30% of the dollar value of the 
sector’s shares to be sold directly. Therefore, the forces of arbitrage could push prices 
back down to more reasonable levels as rational investor’s beliefs got incorporated. A 
detailed analysis of this event, and the explanation, is provided in Ofek and Richardson 
(2001). 
 
VII.  Concluding Remarks 
 
This paper provides an analysis of some existing as well as new evidence of the 
relation between market prices and fundamentals in the internet sector over the period 
January 1998 to February 2000. While it is difficult to disprove market rationality 
definitively on a broad scale, we believe there is a strong, circumstantial case. This case 
is predicated on several important elements: 
• Unlike previous examinations of market rationality, the issue cannot be 
isolated to a single event. Figure 2 shows that there were times when over 
20% of stock market volume was being driven by internet firms. The usual 
explanation that these prices were not tradable, or at least not with huge 
quantities, is not viable here. Furthermore, if in fact asset prices were not 
reflecting fundamentals at these volume levels, then it requires a considerable 
amount of capital for rational investors to compete. 
• To the extent there are specific cases, such as the internet subsidiary, the 
evidence is much stronger against market rationality than previous studies of 
non-internet firms. Moreover, in documenting the various unrelated 
anomalies across firms, the common characteristic is that they are internet 
firms. This fact alone would need to be explained to show that all the 
anomalies occur “by chance”. 
• These specific cases, along with evidence about the level of internet  stock 
prices and their underlying  fundamentals, are broadly consistent with a world 
in which the relevant investors have overly optimistic (or perhaps even crazy) 
                                                                                                                                                 
16 In an IPO, approximately 15-20% of the shares are issued to the public. Generally, the underwriters insist 
upon the shares of the remaining 80-85% shareholders to be restricted from sale for a certain period of time 
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beliefs. That is, the direction of the irrationality generally corresponds to 
over-optimism. 
• The other evidence in this paper, i.e., the volatility of stock prices for internet 
firms, is more difficult to categorize. We have provided some basic stylized 
facts, however, on the magnitude of this volatility in relation to bid-ask 
spreads, which suggest that rational explanations are difficult to come by. 
This evidence may simply represent the amount of noise trading taking place 
during this period. 
In conclusion, we find both the magnitude and depth of the evidence to be so great 
that it is hard to explain and therefore ignore. We provided several potential explanations. 
To us, the most promising one is a model of heterogenous agents with varying degrees of 
beliefs about asset payoffs who are subject to short sales constraints (e.g., Lintner 
(1969)). Whether this theory explains the so-called internet bubble deserves additional 
research. 
                                                                                                                                                 
without their express written consent. This period of time is called the lock-up period.  
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Table 1A 
 
Internet sub-sectors and “old economy” match 
 
A description of internet sub-industries and their mapping to non-internet industries.  For 
each sub-industry we report the total number firms and the total number of firms with 
Compustat data for fiscal year 1999. 
 
 
Industry 
Code Internet Industry Description 
Number of 
firms 
Firms with 
12/99 data Industry 
1 Internet Portal Companies 24 15 Media 
2 Internet Infrastructure Companies 34 22 Computer Hardware 
3 Internet Infrastructure Services 74 47 Computer Software 
4 Internet/B2B Software Companies 54 28 Information Services 
5 Internet Commerce Companies 50 32 Specialty Retail 
6 Internet Consulting/Application Services 50 38 Information Services 
7 Internet Financial Services Companies 23 19 Financial Services 
8 Multi-Sector Internet Companies 2 2 Information Services 
9 Internet Vertical Portal Companies 48 39 Publishing 
10 Internet Direct Marketing & Advertising 26 18 Information Services 
11 Internet B2B Commerce Companies 15 6 Information Services 
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Table 2 
Aggregate financial information and target P/E 
A description of aggregate sales, market value of equity, EBITDA and earnings for 
internet firms with 1999 Financial data available on Compustat.  Target earnings are 
calculated by multiplying the average Earnings/Sales ratio for all firms in the matching 
non-internet industry by aggregate sales for that internet sub-industry.  Target P/E is 
Aggregate market cap/ target earnings. 
 
 
Industry 
Code 
Aggregate 
Market cap 
Aggregate 
sales 
Aggregate 
EBITD 
Agg.Net 
Income 
Industry 
margins 
Target 
earnings 
Target 
P/E 
All      942,967    27,429   (5,750)  (9,888) 0.0568         1,557  605
1      284,565      6,090        404   (1,181) 0.0452            275  1035
2      100,910      2,172          23          13  0.0474            103  980
3      139,442      3,354   (1,562)  (2,846) 0.1169            392  356
4        95,617      1,219      (328)     (457) 0.0436              53  1800
5        72,675      4,459   (3,037)  (3,565) 0.0190              85  856
6        62,697      3,038      (123)     (501) 0.0436            132  474
7        30,968      3,658        270        (57) 0.0927            339  91
8        53,620         192      (126)       394  0.0436                8  6400
9        43,264      2,267      (871)  (1,054) 0.0558            127  342
10        31,278         590      (289)     (390) 0.0436              26  1216
11        27,931         390      (110)     (244) 0.0436              17  1643
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Table 3 
Panel A 
Implied excess return on capital  
 
Implied excess return on capital (1+R*)/(1+R)-1 for internet firms as of 12/1999, 
assuming they already have profitability of comparable established industry, (ie P/E of 
605) 
 
Years Terminal P/E levels 
 10 15 20 25 30
10 50.7% 44.7% 40.6% 37.5% 35.0%
15 31.5% 28.0% 25.5% 23.7% 22.2%
20 22.8% 20.3% 18.6% 17.3% 16.2%
25 17.8% 15.9% 14.6% 13.6% 12.8%
30 14.7% 13.1% 12.0% 11.2% 10.5%
 
Panel B 
Implied excess return on capital 
Implied growth rates g for internet firms as of 12/1999.  Assuming they already have 
profitability of comparable established industry, (ie P/E of 605), and that WACC=16% 
during the growth period. 
 
Years Terminal P/E levels 
 10 15 20 25 30
10 74.8% 67.9% 63.1% 59.5% 56.6%
15 52.5% 48.4% 45.6% 43.5% 41.7%
20 42.4% 39.6% 37.6% 36.0% 34.8%
25 36.7% 34.5% 32.9% 31.8% 30.8%
30 33.0% 31.2% 30.0% 29.0% 28.2%
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 Table 4 
 
Comparison of various volatility measures between internet and non-internet firms over 
the period 1998-2000.  The sample includes 310 internet firms and 4528 non-internet 
firms with price greater than $10. 
 
 
   Internet  Mean   Median   STD   Low   High 
Daily Standard deviation of return No 0.0350 0.0300 0.0203 0.0034 0.3952 
 Yes 0.0742 0.0728 0.0218 0.0135 0.2078 
  Diff 0.0392 a 0.0428 a       
Average daily (high-low)/close No 0.0386 0.0325 0.0229 0.0011 0.2074 
 Yes 0.0954 0.0985 0.0227 0.0059 0.1404 
  Diff 0.0568 a 0.0660 a       
Implied daily STD from High Low No 0.0287 0.0239 0.0175 0.0023 0.4985 
 Yes 0.0671 0.0688 0.0156 0.0068 0.1019 
  Diff 0.0384 a 0.0449 a       
Bid ask spread $ No 0.610 0.188 16.250 0.000 1000 
 Yes 0.348 0.188 0.411 0.063 3 
  Diff -0.2613 0.0000       
Bid ask spread/Mid price No 0.013 0.008 0.031 0.000 1.645 
 Yes 0.007 0.005 0.007 0.000 0.058 
  Diff -0.0055 a -0.0023 a       
 
 
a - Significant at the 1% level 
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Figure 1
Cumulative returns: equaly weighted internet index, S&P 500, NASDAQ
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Figure 2
Fraction of internet firms in total market volume and capitalization
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Figure 3
Histogram and cumulative frequency implied PE ratios of internet firms at 
the end of 1999
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Figure 5
Frequency distribution of maximum 22 day return from 1/1/1999-2/29/2000
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